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Abstract—Large, complex networks are ubiquitous in nature 
and society, and there is great interest in developing rigorous, 
scalable methods for identifying and characterizing their vul-
nerabilities. This paper presents an approach for analyzing the 
dynamics of complex networks in which the network of interest 
is first abstracted to a much simpler, but mathematically 
equivalent, representation, the required analysis is performed 
on the abstraction, and analytic conclusions are then mapped 
back to the original network and interpreted there. We begin 
by identifying a broad and important class of complex net-
works which admit vulnerability-preserving, finite state abstrac-
tions, and develop efficient algorithms for computing these ab-
stractions. We then propose a vulnerability analysis methodol-
ogy which combines these finite state abstractions with formal 
analytics from theoretical computer science to yield a compre-
hensive vulnerability analysis process for networks of real-
world scale and complexity. The potential of the proposed ap-
proach is illustrated with a case study involving a realistic elec-
tric power grid model and also with brief discussions of bio-
logical and social network examples.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognized that technological, biological, and 
social networks, while impressively robust in most circum-
stances, can fail catastrophically in response to focused at-
tacks. Indeed, this combination of robustness and fragility 
appears to be an inherent property of complex, evolving 
networks ranging from the Internet and electric power grids 
to gene regulatory networks and financial markets [e.g., 1-
5]. As a consequence, there is significant interest in develop-
ing methods for reliably detecting and characterizing the 
vulnerabilities of these networks [e.g., 6,7].  
The challenges of vulnerability analysis are particularly 
daunting in the case of complex networks. Most such net-
works are large-scale “systems of systems”, so that analysis 
methods must be computationally efficient. Additionally, 
because these networks perform reliably almost all of the 
time, standard techniques for finding vulnerabilities (e.g., 
computer simulations, “red teaming”) can be ineffective and, 
in any case, are not guaranteed to identify all vulnerabilities. 
These observations suggest that, in order to be practically 
useful, any method for analyzing vulnerabilities of complex 
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networks should be scalable, to enable analysis of networks 
of real-world complexity, and rigorous, so that for instance 
it is guaranteed to find all vulnerabilities of a given class.  
This paper presents a new approach to vulnerability 
analysis which possesses these properties. The proposed 
methodology is based upon aggressive abstraction – dra-
matically simplifying, property preserving abstraction of the 
network of interest [4]. Once an aggressive abstraction is de-
rived, all required analysis is performed using the abstrac-
tion. Analytic conclusions are then mapped back to the 
original network and interpreted there; this mapping is pos-
sible because of the property preserving nature of the ab-
straction procedure.  
Our focus is on dynamical systems with uncountable state 
spaces, as many complex networks are of this type. We be-
gin by identifying a large and important class of dynamical 
networks which admit vulnerability-preserving, finite state 
abstractions, and develop efficient algorithms for recogniz-
ing such networks and for computing their abstraction. We 
then offer a methodology which combines these finite state 
models with formal analytics from theoretical computer sci-
ence [8] to provide a comprehensive vulnerability analysis 
process for networks of real-world scale and complexity. 
The potential of the proposed approach to complex networks 
analysis is illustrated through a case study involving vulner-
ability analysis of a realistic electric power grid and also via 
brief discussions of biological and social network examples.  
II. PRELIMINARIES  
This section introduces the class of network models to be 
considered in the paper and briefly summarizes some tech-
nical background that will be useful in our development.  
The evolution to ensure robust performance in complex 
networks typically leads to systems that possess a “hybrid” 
structure, exhibiting both continuous and discrete dynamics 
[4]. More precisely, these networks often evolve to become 
hybrid dynamical systems – feedback interconnections of 
switching systems, which have discrete state sets, with sys-
tems whose dynamics evolve on continuous state spaces [9].  
More quantitatively, consider the following definitions for 
hybrid dynamical system (HDS) models:  
Definition 2.1: A continuous-time HDS is a control system  
                                             q+ = h(q,k), 
HDSct                                dx/dt = fq(x,u), 
                                               k = p(x), 
where qQ (with |Q| finite) and xXn (with X bounded) 
are the states of the discrete and continuous systems that 
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make up the HDS, um is the control input, h defines the 
discrete system dynamics, {fq} is a family of vector fields 
characterizing the continuous system dynamics, and p de-
fines a partition of state space X into subsets with labels 
k{1, …, K}.  
Definition 2.2: A discrete-time HDS is a control system   
                                             q+ = h(q,k), 
HDSdt                                    x+ = fq(x,u), 
                                               k = p(x).   
We sometimes refer to an HDS using the symbol HDS if the 
nature of the continuous system (continuous- or discrete-
time) is either unimportant or clear from the context.  
The concept of finite state abstraction for an infinite state 
system is illustrated in Figure 1. Consider a complex net-
work with states that evolve on a continuous space and an 
analysis question of interest. Such a situation is depicted at 
the bottom of Figure 1, where the continuous dynamics are 
shown as curves on a continuous state space (blue region), 
and the analysis question involves deciding whether states in 
the green region can evolve to the red region. Reachability 
questions of this sort are difficult to answer for generic com-
plex networks. However, if it is possible to construct a finite 
state abstraction of the network which possesses equivalent 
dynamics, then the analysis task becomes much easier. To 
see this, observe from Figure 1 that a finite state abstraction 
of the original dynamics takes the form of a graph, where 
the states are graph vertices (nodes within the blue region at 
top) and feasible state transitions define the graph’s directed 
edges. Reachability analysis is straightforward with a graph, 
and if the complex network and its abstraction have equiva-
lent reachability properties then the much simpler graph 
analysis also characterizes the reachability of the original 
system.  
Reachability assessment, while valuable, is typically not 
sufficient to answer real-world vulnerability analysis ques-
tions. For instance, suppose that the red region in Figure 1 is 
the set of failure states. It may be of interest to determine if 
all system trajectories which reach the red region first pass 
through the white “alerting” region, so there is warning of 
impending failure, or whether all trajectories which reach 
the red region subsequently return to the blue “normal” re-
gion, and thereby recover from failure. Addressing these 
more intricate questions requires that the analysis be con-
ducted using a language which allows a nuanced description 
of, and reasoning about, network dynamics. We show in [4] 
that linear temporal logic (LTL) provides such a language, 
enabling quantitative specification of all vulnerability prob-
lems we’ve encountered in complex networks analysis. LTL 
extends propositional logic by including temporal operators, 
thereby allowing dynamical phenomena to be analyzed, and 
is similar to natural language and thus is easy to use [10].   
As we wish to use LTL to analyze the dynamics of com-
plex networks and we model these networks as HDS, we tai-
lor our definition of LTL to be compatible with this setting:  
Definition 2.3: The syntax of LTL consists of  
 atomic propositions (q,k), where q  Q is an HDS dis-
crete state and k  K is a label for a subset in the con-
tinuous system state space partition;  
 formulas composed from atomic propositions using a 
grammar of Boolean (  , ) and temporal (U, 
) operators.  
The semantics of LTL follows from interpreting formulas on 
trajectories of HDS, that is, on sequences of (q, k) pairs: (q, 
k) = (q0, k0), (q1, k1), …, (qT, kT).  
The Boolean operators  and  are disjunction and nega-
tion, as usual. The temporal operators U and  are read “un-
til” and “next”, respectively, with U specifying that  
must hold until  holds and  signifying that  will be true 
at the next time instant (see [10] for a more thorough de-
scription).  
Abstractions which preserve LTL also preserve vulner-
abilities [4]. Thus we seek an abstraction procedure which 
preserves LTL: given a system representation 1, the proce-
dure should generate a system abstraction 2 which is such 
that {1 |= }  {2 |= } for all LTL formulas  (where |= 
denotes formula satisfaction). Bisimulation is a powerful 
method for abstracting finite state systems to yield simpler 
finite state systems that are equivalent from the perspective 
of LTL [10]. However, the problem of constructing finite 
state bisimulations for continuous state systems is largely 
unexplored (but see the seminal work [11,12]). Indeed, one 
of the contributions of this paper is to develop a theoretically 
sound, practically implementable approach to obtaining fi-
nite state bisimulations for complex network models.  
Bisimulation is typically defined for transition systems, so 
we first introduce this notion (see [10] for details):  
Definition 2.4: A transition system is a four-tuple T = (S, 
, Y, h) with state set S, transition relation   S  S, out-
put set Y, and output map h: S  Y. T is finite if |S| is finite.  
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Figure 1. Finite state abstraction. Cartoon illustrates that abstrac-
tion preserves network dynamics: trajectories of the infinite state 
system (curves in blue region at bottom) are mapped to equiva-
lent finite state trajectories (sequences of state transitions at top).  
  
Transition relation  defines admissible state transitions, so 
(q, q), denoted q  q, if T can transition from q to q.  
Bisimilar transition systems share a common output set 
and have dynamics which are equivalent from the perspec-
tive of these outputs:  
Definition 2.5: Transition systems TS = (S, S, Y, hS) and 
TP = (P, P, Y, hP) are bisimilar via relation R  S  P iff:  
• s ~ p  hS(s) = hP(p) (R respects observations);  
• s ~ p, s S s   p ~ s such that p P p (TP simu-
lates TS, denoted TS  TP);  
• p ~ s, p P p   s ~ p such that s S s (TP  TS).  
A standard result from theoretical computer science [e.g., 
10] shows that bisimulation preserves LTL:  
Proposition 2.1: If T1 and T2 are bisimilar transition sys-
tems and  is an LTL formula then {T1 |= }  { T2 |= }.  
The following alternative definition for bisimulation is 
easily shown to be equivalent to the one presented in Defini-
tion 2.5 and is useful in the subsequent development:  
Definition 2.6: A finite partition : S  P of the state space 
S of transition system T = (S, , Y, h) naturally induces a 
quotient transition system T/~ = (P, ~, Y, h~) of T pro-
vided that  
• (s) = (s) (denoted s ~ s)  h(s) = h(s);  
• h~(p) = h(s) if p = (s);  
• ~ is defined so that (s) ~ (s) iff s  s.  
Transition system T and its quotient T/~ are bisimilar if an 
additional condition holds:  
Proposition 2.2: Suppose T/~ is defined as in Definition 2.6 
and, in addition, (s) ~ (s)   s ~ s  s ~ s such 
that s  s. Then T and T/~ are bisimilar.   
Finally, we introduce a class of continuous state (control) 
systems which is important in applications.  
Definition 2.7: The continuous-time system dx/dt=f(x,u), 
with f: nmn, is differentially flat if there exists (flat) 
outputs zm such that z = H(x), x = F1(z, dz/dt, …, drz/dtr), 
and u = F2(z, dz/dt, …, drz/dtr) for some integer r and maps 
H, F1, F2.  
Definition 2.8: The discrete-time system x+ = f(x,u) is dif-
ference flat (with memory k) if there exists (flat) outputs 
zm such that z = H(x), x(t) = F1(z(t), z(t+1), …, 
z(t+k−1)), and u(t) = F2(z(t), z(t+1), …, z(t+k−1)) for some 
maps H, F1, F2.  
Background on flat systems may be found in [13]. Many 
real-world control systems are flat, including all controllable 
linear systems as well as all feedback linearizable systems. 
Perhaps more importantly, the complex, evolving networks 
underlying so much of advanced technology, biology, and 
social processes frequently possess flat subsystems.  
III. FINITE STATE ABSTRACTION  
In this section we demonstrate that hybrid systems with 
(differentially or difference) flat continuous systems admit 
finite state bisimulations and present algorithms for con-
structing the bisimilar abstractions.  
Consider an HDS of the form given in Definition 2.1 or 
2.2. The following provides a transition system representa-
tion for the continuous system dynamics of HDS:  
Definition 3.1: The transition system model THDSc for the 
continuous system portion of HDS is the collection THDSc = 
{Tqk}, with one transition system Tqk = (Xqk, qk, Yqk, hqk) 
specified for each (q, k) pair. Each Tqk has bounded state 
space Xqk, finite output set Yqk, an output map hqk: Xqk  
Yqk that defines a finite partition of Xqk with labels yYqk, 
and transition relation qk reflecting the discrete- or con-
tinuous-time dynamics:  
 for discrete-time continuous systems, x qk x iff u 
such that x = fq(x,u) on subset k;  
 for continuous-time continuous systems, x qk x iff 
there is a trajectory x: [0, T]  Xqk of dx/dt = fq(x,u), a 
time t (0,T), and adjacent partitions of Xqk labeled y, 
yYqk such that x(0)=x, x(T)=x, x([0,t))y, and 
x((t,T])y.  
We make the standard assumption that k: X  K partitions 
the HDS continuous system state space X into polytopes and 
that all HDS discrete system transitions are triggered by k 
transitions [9] (see Definitions 2.1 and 2.2).  
Definition 3.1 allows HDS to be modeled as a feedback 
interconnection of two transition systems, one with continu-
ous state space and one with finite state set:  
Definition 3.2: The transition system THDS associated with 
the HDS given in Definition 2.1 or 2.2 is a feedback inter-
connection of 1.) the continuous system transition system 
THDSc = {Tqk} given in Definition 3.1 and 2.) the transition 
system associated with the HDS discrete system, given by 
THDSd = (Q, d, Q, id), where id is the identity map and q 
d q iff k such that q = h(q, k). Thus THDS = (Q  X, 
HDS,  Q  Y, hHDS), where Q  X = q (k {q}  Xqk), Q  
Y = q (k {q}  Yqk), and the definitions for HDS and 
hHDS follow immediately from the transition relation and 
output map definitions specified for THDSc and THDSd.  
Because the transition system THDSd corresponding to the 
HDS discrete system is already a finite state system, the 
main challenge in abstracting HDS to finite state systems is 
associated with finding finite state bisimulations for the con-
tinuous systems THDSc = {Tqk}. This is made explicit in the 
following  
Theorem 1: If each transition system Tqk associated with 
THDS is bisimilar to its finite quotient transition system Tqk/~ 
= (Yqk, ~, Yqk, id) and the state space quotient partitions 
defined by the hqk satisfy a mild compatibility condition then 
THDS admits a finite bisimulation.  
Proof: The proof is straightforward and is given in [4].      
  
Theorem 1 shows that the key step in obtaining a finite 
state bisimulation for HDS THDS, and thus for HDS, is con-
structing bisimulations for the continuous state transition 
systems Tqk. We therefore focus on this latter problem for 
the remainder of the section. Our first main result along 
these lines is for difference flat continuous systems:  
Theorem 2: Given any finite partition : Z  Y of the flat 
output space Z of a difference flat system, the associated 
transition system TF = (X, , Y,   H) admits a bisimilar 
quotient TF/~.  
Proof: Consider the equivalence relation R that identifies 
state pairs (x, x) which generate identical sets of k-length 
output symbol sequences y = y0 y1 … yk−1, and the quotient 
system TF/~ induced by R. R defines a finite partition of X 
(both |Y| and k are finite), and x ~ x    H(x) =   H(x) 
so that R respects observations. TF  TF/~ follows immedi-
ately from the definition of quotient systems. To see that 
TF/~  TF, note that flatness ensures any symbol string y = 
yk yk+1 … is realizable by transition system TF; thus x  x at 
time t implies that x and x can transition to equivalent states 
at time t  1. Therefore, from Definition 2.5, TF and TF/~ are 
bisimilar.                                                                              
Remark 3.1: Efficient algorithms exist for checking if a 
given system is difference flat, so Theorem 2 provides a 
practically implementable means of identifying discrete-time 
continuous state systems which admit finite bisimulation [4].  
Remark 3.2: The flat output trajectory completely defines 
the evolution of a difference flat system. As a consequence, 
because any finite partition of flat output space induces a fi-
nite bisimilar quotient for the flat system, this partition can 
be refined to yield any desired level of detail in the abstrac-
tion.  
An analogous result holds for differentially flat HDS con-
tinuous systems. Our development of this result requires the 
following lemmas.  
Lemma 3.1: A control system is differentially flat iff it is 
dynamic feedback linearizable.  
Proof: The proof is given in [14].                                        
Lemma 3.2: Control system  admits a finite bisimulation 
iff any representation of  obtained through coordinate 
transformation and/or invertible feedback also admits a fi-
nite bisimulation.  
Proof: The proof is straightforward.                                   
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 suggest the following procedure for 
constructing finite bisimulations for differentially flat sys-
tems: 1.) transform the flat system into a linear control sys-
tem via feedback linearization, 2.) compute a finite bisimula-
tion for the linear system, and 3.) map the bisimilar model 
back to the original system representation. As a result, we 
focus on building finite bisimulations for linear control sys-
tems.  
In particular, the control system of interest is one “chain” 
of a Brunovsky normal form (BNF) system BNF [4]:  
dx1/dt = x2, 
dx2/dt = x3, 
… 
dxn/dt = u. 
Concentrating on this system entails no loss of generality, as 
any controllable linear system can be modeled as a collec-
tion of these single chain systems, one for each input, and 
the decoupled nature of the chains ensures we can abstract 
each one independently and then “patch” the abstractions 
together to obtain an abstraction for the full system.  
Consider the following partition of the (assumed 
bounded) state space X  n of BNF:  
Definition 3.3: Partition  is the map : X  Y that parti-
tions X into subsets yis = {xX | x1[i, (i+1)), sign(x2)=s1, 
…, sign(xn)=sn-1}, where i is an integer and s is an (n1)-
vector of “signs” specifying a particular orthant of X.  
Note that  partitions X into “slices” orthogonal to the x1-
axis.  
We are now in a position to state  
Theorem 3: The transition system TBNF = (X, , Y, ) as-
sociated with system BNF and partition  admits a finite 
bisimilar quotient TBNF/~ = (Y, ~, Y, id).  
Proof: TBNF/~ is finite because |Y| is finite. Assume ~ is 
constructed so that (x) ~ (x)  x  x, with the latter 
specified as in Definition 3.1. Then all the conditions of 
Definition 2.6 are satisfied, and from Proposition 2.2 we 
need only show (x) ~ (x)  x~x x~x such that 
x  x. This amounts to demonstrating that if x can be 
driven through face F of slice (x) then any x in that slice 
can be driven through F as well, which can be shown by 
checking this property for the system x1(n) = u on each ort-
hant of X.                                                                              
Remark 3.3: The result given in Theorem 3 is most useful 
in situations where the control input u can be chosen large 
relative to the system “drift”. Abstraction methods for appli-
cations in which control authority is limited are given in [4].  
Next we turn to the task of computing finite bisimulations 
for HDS. We focus on constructing bisimulations for HDS 
continuous systems, as HDS discrete systems already pos-
sess finite state representations, and in particular on abstract-
ing differentially flat continuous systems; the derivation of 
algorithms for difference flat continuous systems is analo-
gous but simpler and is therefore omitted (see [4]).  
Consider, without loss of generality (see Lemma 3.1), the 
problem of computing a finite state abstraction for continu-
ous-time linear control system lc: dx/dt = Ax + Bu (where 
A,B are matrices). The transition system associated with lc 
is Tlc = (X, lc, Y, h), with  h: X  Y any finite, hypercubic 
partition of X and lc specified as in Definition 3.1. The fi-
nite state abstraction of interest is quotient system Tlc/~ = 
(Y, lc~, Y, id). Observe that in order to obtain Tlc/~ it is 
only necessary to determine the set of admissible transition 
relations lc~.  
  
As most applications of interest involve large-scale sys-
tems, it is desirable to develop efficient algorithms for com-
puting lc~. We now introduce such a procedure. The algo-
rithm decides whether a transition y lc~ y between two ad-
jacent cells of the lattice y, y is allowed, and is repeated for 
all candidate transitions of interest. We begin by summariz-
ing a simple algorithm, based on computational linear sys-
tem results given in [15], for deciding whether y lc~ y is 
admissible. Let k be the number of the coordinate axis or-
thogonal to the common face between y and y, V be the set 
of vertices shared by y and y, and akT represent row k of A. 
Define k(w) to be the projection of vector w onto axis k, 
and suppose y < y. Then y lc~ y iff k(Avi + Bu) > 0 for 
some vi V and uU. An algorithm which “operationalizes” 
this observation is  
Algorithm 3.1:  
If y < y:  
 If any element of row k of B is nonzero, y lc~ y is 
true. STOP. 
 Repeat until y lc~ y is determined to be true or all ver-
tices have been checked:  
o Select a vertex vi  V.  
o Compute the inner product p = akT vi.  
o If p > 0 then y lc~ y is true. STOP.  
 If y lc~ y has not been found to be true it is false.  
If y > y: Algorithm is the same except that the comparison p 
> 0 is replaced by p < 0.  
A difficulty with Algorithm 3.1 is that the number of ver-
tices shared by two adjacent cells is 2n1, so that checking 
them becomes unmanageable even for moderately-sized sys-
tems. Interestingly, the algorithm can be modified so that 
feasibility of a transition can be tested by considering only a 
single well-chosen vertex, independent of the size of the 
model [16]. The new algorithm is therefore extremely effi-
cient and can be applied to very large systems. Let v0 be the 
lowest vertex (in a component-wise sense) shared by y, y 
and let ak+ (ak−) be the sum of positive (negative) elements of 
row k of A, excluding the diagonal. We can now state  
Algorithm 3.2 [16]: 
If y < y:  
 If any element of row k of B is nonzero, y lc~ y is 
true. STOP.  
 Compute the inner product p = akT v0.  
 If p + ak+ > 0 then y lc~ y is true. STOP.  
 Otherwise y lc~ y is false.  
If y > y: Algorithm is the same except that the comparison p 
+ ak+ > 0 is replaced by p + ak < 0.   
A Matlab program which implements Algorithm 3.2 is pre-
sented in [4]. This program has been applied to systems with 
n = 10 000 state variables using desktop computers.  
IV. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS  
This section considers the vulnerability assessment prob-
lem: given a complex network and a class of failures of in-
terest, does there exist an attack which causes the system to 
experience such failure? Other important vulnerability 
analysis tasks, including vulnerability exploitation and miti-
gation, are investigated in [4]. The proposed approach to 
vulnerability assessment leverages the finite state abstraction 
results derived in the preceding section. The basic idea is 
straightforward: given an HDS model for a network of inter-
est and a class of failures of concern: 1.) construct a finite 
bisimulation for the HDS network model, 2.) conduct the 
vulnerability analysis on the system abstraction, and 3.) map 
the analysis results back to the original system model.  
Observe that the proposed approach possesses desirable 
characteristics. For instance, the analytic process is scalable, 
because both the abstraction methodology and the tools 
available for detecting vulnerabilities in finite state systems 
[e.g., 8] are computationally efficient. Additionally, the 
analysis is rigorous. Because HDS vulnerabilities are ex-
pressible as LTL formulas, and bisimulation preserves LTL, 
the original complex network and its abstraction have iden-
tical vulnerabilities. Formal analysis tools such as model 
checking [8] can be structured to identify all vulnerabilities 
of the finite state abstraction, and bisimilarity then implies 
that the approach is guaranteed to find all vulnerabilities of 
the original network as well.  
We now quantify the proposed approach to vulnerability 
assessment. It is supposed that the complex network of in-
terest can be modeled as an HDS, HDS, and that the net-
work’s desired or “normal” behavior can be characterized 
with an LTL formula ; generalizing the situation to a set of 
LTL formulas {i} is straightforward. Consider the follow-
ing  
Definition 4.1: Given an HDS HDS and an LTL encoding  
of the desired network behavior, the vulnerability assess-
ment problem involves determining whether HDS can be 
made to violate .  
The proposed vulnerability assessment method employs 
bounded model checking (BMC), a powerful technique for 
deciding whether a given finite state transition system satis-
fies a particular LTL specification over a finite, user-
specified time horizon [8]. Briefly, BMC checks whether a 
finite transition system T satisfies an LTL specification  on 
a time interval [0, k], denoted T |=k , in two steps: 1.) trans-
late T |=k  to a proposition [T, ]k which is satisfied by, and 
only by, transition system trajectories that violate  (this is 
always possible), and 2.) check if [T, ]k is satisfiable using 
a modern SAT solver [8]. Note that because modern SAT 
solvers are extremely powerful, this approach to model 
checking can be implemented with problems of real-world 
scale.  
We are now in a position to state our vulnerability as-
sessment algorithm. Let THDS denote the transition system 
associated with HDS, and consider the vulnerability assess-
ment problem given in Definition 4.1. We have  
  
Algorithm 4.1: Vulnerability assessment  
1. Construct a finite bisimilar abstraction T for THDS using 
the results of Section 3.  
2. Check satisfiability of [T, ]k using BMC:  
o if [T, ]k is not satisfiable then T is not vulnerable 
and thus HDS is not vulnerable (on time horizon k);  
o if [T, ]k is satisfiable then T, and therefore HDS, is 
vulnerable, and the SAT solver “witness” is an ex-
ploitation of the vulnerability.  
To illustrate the utility of the proposed approach to vul-
nerability assessment we apply the analytic method to an 
important complex network: an electric power (EP) grid. EP 
grids are naturally represented as HDS, with the continuous 
system modeling the generator and load dynamics as well as 
power flow constraints and the discrete system capturing 
protection logic switching and other “supervisory” behavior:  
Definition 4.2: The HDS power grid model EP takes the 
form  
                                      q+ = h(q, k, v), 
EP                             dx/dt = fq(x, y, u), 
                                  0 = gq(x, y),  
                                  k = p(x, y),  
where q and x are the discrete and continuous system states, 
v and u denote exogenous inputs, y is the vector of “alge-
braic variables”, and all other terms are analogous to those 
introduced in Definition 2.1.  
The continuous system portion of grid model EP is feed-
back linearizable [17], which implies the continuous system 
is differentially flat and consequently that EP admits a finite 
abstraction. Additionally, it can be shown that grid vulner-
abilities are expressible as LTL formulas composed of 
atomic propositions which depend only on q and k [18]. 
Thus Algorithm 4.1 is directly applicable to power grids.  
We now summarize the results of a vulnerability assess-
ment for the 20bus grid shown in Figure 2. This grid pro-
vides a simple but useful representation of a real EP system 
for which (proprietary) data are available to us [4]. The grid 
can be modeled as an HDS EP of the form given in Defini-
tion 4.2. The report [4] gives a Matlab encoding of the spe-
cific HDS model used in this study. Because the model EP 
corresponds to a real world grid, the behaviors of the model 
and the actual grid can be compared. For example, the real 
grid recently experienced a large cascading voltage collapse, 
and data was collected for this event. We simulated this cas-
cading outage (see Figure 3, top plot) and found close agree-
ment between the behavior of the actual grid and the model 
EP. Observe that this result is encouraging given the well-
known difficulties associated with reproducing such cascad-
ing dynamics with computer models (see, e.g., [17,18]).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. One-line diagram for the 20-bus EP grid model used 
in the vulnerability assessment case study.  
 
 
Figure 3. Sample simulation results for 20-bus EP grid model. 
Plot at top is from the model validation study and shows the 
evolution of voltages at all 20 buses; these voltage time series 
are in good agreement with those observed in the correspond-
ing cascading voltage collapse for the actual grid. Plot at bot-
tom depicts voltage time series which result from applying the 
vulnerability exploitation procedure designed using the pro-
posed finite state abstraction methodology.  
  
Vulnerability assessment was performed using Algorithm 
4.1. It was assumed that the grid’s attacker wishes to drive 
the voltage at bus 11 to unacceptably low levels, so that the 
loads at this bus would not be served, and that the attacker 
has only limited grid access. In particular, we consider here 
a scenario in which the attacker can gain assess to the gen-
erator at bus 2 via cyber means [18]. Note that this class of 
vulnerabilities is interesting because the access point – the 
generator at bus 2 – is geographically remote from the target 
of the attack – the loads at bus 11.  
The first step in the vulnerability assessment procedure 
specified in Algorithm 4.1 involves constructing a finite 
state bisimulation T for EP; this abstraction is computed us-
ing Algorithm 3.2. The second step in Algorithm 4.1 is to 
apply BMC to T to determine if it is possible to realize the 
attack objective, i.e., low voltage at bus 11, through admis-
sible manipulation of the generator at bus 2. We employed 
NuSMV, an open source software tool for formal verifica-
tion of finite state systems, for this analysis [19]. This vul-
nerability assessment reveals that it is possible for the at-
tacker to realize the given objective via the assumed grid ac-
cess, and gives a finite state “trace” of one means of exploit-
ing the vulnerability. Using this trace, we synthesize an ex-
ploitation attack which is directly implementable with the 
HDS model EP. Sample simulation results are shown in 
Figure 3 (bottom plot). It can be seen from the bus voltage 
time series in Figure 3 that the attacker’s goals can indeed be 
realized, in this case by initiating a cascading voltage col-
lapse which takes down bus 11 as well as most of the rest of 
the grid.  
V. DISCUSSION   
This paper presents an approach for analyzing complex 
networks in which the network of interest is first abstracted 
to a much simpler, but mathematically equivalent, represen-
tation, the required analysis is performed using the abstrac-
tion, and analytic conclusions are then mapped back to the 
original network and interpreted there. We identify an im-
portant class of complex networks which admit vulnerabil-
ity-preserving, finite state abstractions, provide efficient al-
gorithms for computing these abstractions, and offer a vul-
nerability analysis methodology which combines finite state 
network representations with formal analytics to enable rig-
orous vulnerability analysis for networks of real-world scale 
and complexity. The considerable potential of the method is 
demonstrated through a case study involving a realistic elec-
tric power grid model.  
We now demonstrate that the proposed approach to ana-
lyzing complex network dynamics can also be applied to 
biological and social systems. Consider first a biological ex-
ample. Many aspects of the physiology of living organisms 
oscillate with a period of approximately 24 hours, corre-
sponding to the duration of a day, and the molecular basis 
for this circadian rhythm has been quantified in several or-
ganisms. For instance, a useful model for the gene regula-
tory network responsible for circadian rhythm in Drosophila 
melanogaster (fruit fly) is [20]:  
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where MP, P0, P1, P2, C, and CN are state variables corre-
sponding to the concentrations of the constituents of the cir-
cadian rhythm gene network, vsP is an exogenous (control) 
input signal associated with the light-dark cycle of the envi-
ronment, and all other terms are constant model parameters.  
As is evident from Definition 2.7, a differentially flat sys-
tem possesses (flat) outputs, equal in number to the number 
of inputs, which permit the system states and inputs to be re-
covered through algebraic manipulation of these outputs and 
their time derivatives. In the case of Drosophila circadian 
rhythm, CN is the flat output. To see this, note that C and its 
time derivatives can be obtained from the sixth equation 
through manipulation of CN and its derivatives. These terms, 
in turn, permit P2 (and its derivatives) to be obtained from 
the fifth equation, and continuing in this way up the “chain” 
of equations gives all of the states and the input vsP. Thus the 
system states and input can be obtained from knowledge of 
CN and its derivatives, proving that the above gene network 
model for Drosophila circadian rhythm is differentially flat. 
This, in turn, implies that the model admits a finite state 
bisimulation (Theorem 3). We have applied Algorithm 4.1 
to this finite state model and identified gene network vulner-
abilities which are consistent with those discussed in [21].  
Consider next the phenomenon of social movements, that 
is, large, informal groupings of individuals and/or organiza-
tions focused on a particular issue, for instance of political, 
social, economic, or religious significance [e.g., 22]. Given 
the importance of social movements and the desire to under-
stand their emergence and growth, numerous mathematical 
representations have been proposed to characterize their dy-
namics. For example, [23] suggests a model in which each 
individual in a population of interest can be in one of three 
states – member (of the movement), potential member, and 
ex-member – and interactions between individuals can lead 
to transitions between these affiliation states (e.g., potential 
  
members can be “persuaded” to become members). In par-
ticular, [23] proposes the following model for social move-
ment dynamics:  
                    dP/dt  =   PM  1E, 
           dM/dt = PM  2ME − 3M, 
           dE/dt  = 2ME  3M  1E, 
where P, M, and E denote the fractions of potential mem-
bers, members, and ex-members in the population,  can be 
interpreted to be the system’s input, and , 1, 2, 3 are 
nonnegative constants related to the probabilities of indi-
viduals undergoing the various state transitions. It is worth 
noting that this model is shown in [23] to provide a good de-
scription for the growth of real world social movements.  
This model for social dynamics is differentially flat with 
flat output E. To see this, observe that M and its time deriva-
tives can be obtained from the third equation through ma-
nipulation of E and its derivatives. These terms, in turn, per-
mit P (and its derivatives) to be obtained from the second 
equation. Finally, knowledge of P, M, E, and their deriva-
tives allows the input  to be recovered from the first equa-
tion. Thus all of the system states as well as the input can be 
obtained from knowledge of E and its derivatives, which 
shows that the social movement model is differentially flat. 
This, in turn, implies that the model admits a finite state 
bisimilar abstraction (see Theorem 3).  
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